Top-down and state-led development based on central planning by an expanding professional technocracy became a central tenet of the Monarchy’s approach to social engineering and modernization. This panel investigates some of the lasting legacies of the transformative development projects and practices of that era. It focuses on the post-coup era (1954-1979) to elaborate its importance for understanding the present moment in Iran and invites considering discontinuity in continuity and continuity in discontinuity.
The panel participants explore (un)intended consequences of development in monarchic Iran, particularly in the post-coup era, and their relevance for the current conjuncture. The first paper works with the extra-economic aspects of progress and planning in Iran to discuss the 1979 revolutionary moment. It argues for a continuous tension in pre- and post-revolutionary Iranian state, which is crystallized for the first time in the post-coup era around the idea of progress and its temporal implication. Next presentation attempts to historicize the ecological crisis in south-west Iran and traces back the causes of ecological degradation of the Khuzestan province to the pre-revolutionary period. It argues that since the mid-twentieth century, Iran’s hydro-modernization projects (added up to the petroleum infrastructures at work since the beginning of the century) accelerated the transformations toward a capitalistic society-nature metabolism in this province. The third paper analyzes the current pronatalist policies in Iran by tracing the transformations of reproductive politics in the pre-revolutionary period. It focuses on how in the post-coup era, the population and reproductive practices of the families became the subjects/objects of development planning. Since then, it argues, reproductive politics transformed into a strategic site of governing. Finally, the last paper evaluates the paradoxical role played by the massive and costly major development projects that have symbolized Iran's attempts at modernization. Straddling the Monarchy and the Islamic Republic, grand projects such as the national railroad, dams and agribusinesses, or the controversial nuclear program, have in fact served to consolidate the rule of technical experts and factions of political elites, rather than act as the miraculous gateways to a promised modernity they were promised to be.
Looking at the ecology of Khuzestan reveals the fact that the extremes (dust storms, acid rain, severe drought, etc.) are the new normal in this south-west province of Iran. Anthropocene, the geological age defined by human impacts, demonstrates itself clearly in this corner of the world, which was once called ‘the oil capital of the world’ and ‘’a key for Iran’s cosmopolitan turn’. I argue that there is a link between Khuzestan’s current dystopian landscape, oil infrastructure development and large-scale hydro-projects. To grasp the complexity of its ecological degradation, one must understand it as a process, a historical socio-ecological process. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the infrastructures of oil have triggered radical and sequential shifts in society-nature relations. The first period of rapid transformations was defined by the formation of Anglo-Persian Oil Company and its subsequent alteration in the ecology of Khuzestan.
In this paper, I focus on the second rapid shift in the society-nature relationship which was erupted by new forms of land and water governance in the 1950s and 1960s. Under the shadow of the cold war conflicts, and according to large-scale technological programs and top-down planning, Dez Dam Project was started in 1956. The planning was based on the Tennessee Valley Authority Act - a New Deal Development project, which its aim was to ‘rebuild Khuzestan province’. By the construction of this monstrous dam, a new era for Khuzestan’s physical geography took off, which necessarily entailed socio-ecological transformations. Whereas the oil industry initiated capitalist land tenure pattern, westernized land use and capitalist social relations in this region, this large-scale hydro-modernization, intensified such patterns and relations. New processes of dispossession and displacements, regulation of rivers and land (‘taming’ nature), construction of new roads, power plants and factories, etc. further rifted apart the socio-natural metabolism in this province. Khuzestan’s hydro-development in the 1950s could be understood as the pilot project for Development Plans after the 1960s and Shah’s White Revolution. The western technical and managerial ‘know-how’ continues to define the socio-natural metabolism of Khuzestan to date.
