Russian Government Actions against Russian Deserters in Iran in the 19th Century

This article addresses the reaction of the Russian government to the presence of Russian deserters in Iran and to their service there. Desertions of Russian soldiers to Iran and their acceptance by Iranian officials created a stir in Russian diplomatic and military circles, including the personal involvement of the emperor, Nicholas I, and several high-ranking diplomats. The issue of deserters that arose during the second half of the 19th century is presented in the broader context of Russia’s aspirations to dominate Iran as a player in the Great Game.
Russian soldiers started to escape to Iran through the Caucasus at the very beginning of the 19th century, when Russia established its military presence there. Two Russo-Iranian wars further increased the number of deserters, so that their presence in the Iranian provinces of Azerbaijan and Khorasan by the second half of the 19th century became a factor in the Russo-Iranian relationship. Using stories of specific deserters, this paper demonstrates that Russian diplomatic and military authorities took this issue quite seriously and put a lot of pressure on the Iranian government and local administration, including direct threats, demanding deserters’ arrest and extradition. The Convention about Deserters signed by Russia and Iran in 1844 created a legal backing for Russia’s demands.
Though the author is aware of the recent publications by Stephanie Cronin on Russians in Iranian military service in the 19th and early 20th century, the current paper is entirely based on Russian archival sources, which include interviews with several deserters. It builds upon the concept of Russian Orientalism, mainly in relation to individual Russians in Iran. This article demonstrates that Russian Orientalism generated by the duality of Russia’s national identity also manifested itself at the level of the Russian government. Its overreaction to the presence of Russian deserters in Iran and their service there can be interpreted as a way to compensate in Asia for what ultimately became a failed aspiration in Europe – the desire to prove Russia’s equality to the Western European empires and Russia’s natural affiliation with the West.