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Iran and the United Nations, 1943-1968

National sovereignty is arguably the central concern of Iran’s modern history, and the independence of nations—and the end of empires-- were hallmarks of the postwar world created by the United Nations. From the initial ideas on a new post WWII order set out in the 1941 Atlantic Charter, Iran and the United Nations have been connected by a dynamic relationship. The Tehran Conference of 1943 was the official site for two events. The “Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran”—promoted by the Shah and signed by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union--stated their shared commitment to the “independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.” The document was preceded by important discussions outlining the shape of the postwar international order, in particular President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ideas for the United Nations Organization. Per Roosevelt, Iran’s postwar situation was to a “test case” for the viability of the new international system.

The papers on this panel explore the dynamic relationship between Iran and the UN. From the Tehran Conference of 1943—in which Iran was the site for early discussions on the new global order--to Iran’s hosting of the UN’s first international conference on human rights in 1968, the UN has provided a powerful platform for the making and testing of sovereignty claims. Ahmad Kasravi wrote that the UN strengthened Iran’s claims to equality on the world stage (the rights of small nations), and the UN enjoyed a high level of credibility inside of the country. What did it mean to see Iran as a test case for the new international order? How did Iranians engage with this international organization? What sort of platform did it provide? What benefits did the relationship hold for Iran and what sorts of obligations did it create? In what ways did the interaction with the UN foster the development of various Iranian political cultures in the pre 1979 period, and how did engagement at the UN promote Iran’s vision of itself as a vital participant in the postwar world?

"Britain and Iran’s Early Membership to the United Nations, 1941-1946”

“From the Tehran Conference to the Korean War: Iran as a ‘Test Case’ for the United Nations, 1943-1953”

“Sovereignty and Rights in the Age of Global Governance”

Presentations

“From the Tehran Conference to the Korean War: Iran as a ‘Test Case’ for the United Nations, 1943-1953”
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On January 23, 1943, the Division of Near Eastern Affairs at the State Department set out the US’s new policy on Iran. Written by analyst John Jernegan, it was highly critical of both Great Britain and the Soviet Union as occupying wartime powers; neither was trusted to preserve Iran’s independence or to protect her territorial autonomy. The “result” of the British and Soviet occupations, wrote Jernagan, “has been interference with the internal affairs of Iran, amounting at times to a virtually complete negation of Iranian sovereignty and independence. . . largely because of this occupation of Iranian territory, the governmental machinery of Iran, and its economic structure, have been seriously weakened.” The US policy, by contrast, was to strengthen Iranian independence by strengthening her institutions. The objective was, in Jernagan’s words, the “development, with American assistance, of a stable Iranian government and a strong Iranian economy.” At the war’s end Iran was no longer to be under British trusteeship or Soviet tutelage: she was to be secured as a sovereign nation.

At the Tehran Conference of 1943, the Allies discussed the shape of the postwar international order and the place of Iranian sovereignty within it. President Franklin D. Roosevelt is credited with the view that Iran would be a “test case” for the success of the postwar order embodied by the United Nations. Yet his view did not shape the years to come. Between the Tehran Conference, the Azerbeijan crisis, the heating up of the Cold War and the onset of war on the Korean peninsula, this paper traces the US position on Iran and the UN from Roosevelt to Truman and from an endorsement of Iran’s sovereignty to a willingness to subvert it. It highlights the ongoing conflict between the United States and Great Britain regarding Iran, which was not solved in 1945, as well as the dramatic transformation of US policy between 1943 and 1953.

Britain and Iran’s Early Membership to the United Nations, 1941–1946
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During the Second World War, Britain was the key member of an alliance fighting for democracy and a free world from the occupying forces of Germany in Europe and of Japan in the Far East. At the same time, somewhat ironically, Britain had the uncomfortable position of being an occupying force in Iran. A few months after the invasion of Iran, the concept of the United Nations was sketched out by President Franklin D Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill in December 1941. While notions of inter-governmental cooperation and the protection of liberty were the cornerstones of this international organisation, Britain actively and deliberately intervened in a neutral country and bypassed Iran’s national sovereignty in order to prioritise its needs. By keeping to the timeframe of Britain’s occupation of Iran, my paper examines not only this uncomfortable dichotomy, but also the implications of British governmental attitude towards Iran’s eventual membership to the United Nations Charter in 1945.

In order to understand British attitude towards Iran in the United Nations, this paper will focus on five key questions. Firstly, how did the British government attempt to reconcile its military occupation of Iran with the war against Fascism? Secondly, how did the British government envision an independent Iran in the post-war era? Thirdly, to what extent did this translate into membership to the United Nations? Fourthly, what were the opinions of the British government towards Iran’s membership? Fifthly, how was propaganda used to promote the idea of the United Nations in Iran?

This research will primarily rely upon cabinet papers as well government correspondence, alongside British newspapers from the time. While British membership in the United Nations has been the subject of a whole body of literature, its attitude towards individual countries’ membership are limited to India and Israel. This paper will therefore greatly add to our understanding of Iran’s early membership by placing it in a more global context.

Sovereignty and Rights in the Age of Global Governance
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How to secure Iran’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity was a fraught issue at the end of the Second World War. With the Anglo-Soviet invasion of August 1941, the forced abdication of Reza Shah Pahlevi, and the intensification of political, ethnic, religious, linguistic and ideological rivalry during the war years, this old concern became the most contentious of political riddles. At this crucial historical juncture, Iranian lawyers, diplomats, academics and institutions increasingly recognized the pragmatic utility of the constitutionally sanctioned “equality rights” law-and-order mode of governance articulated during the Constitutional Revolution (1906-1909). However, for forty years this framework—first secured in Articles VIII and IX of the 1907 Supplementary Constitutional Law—had lain dormant. In the postwar period, and via the new forum provided by the UN, they would become politically active once again.

This paper explores how a generation of Iranian lawyers and diplomats aligned Articles VIII and IX with the founding documents of the United Nations: the 1941 Atlantic Charter, the 1942 United Nations Declaration and the 1945 United Nations Charter. With the ratification of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles VIII and IX were increasingly constituted as fundamental principles for legal, social and political conduct in post-WWII Iran. To give further impetus to their arguments for this “equality rights” framework, Iranian lawyers fused the equal rights and equal protection focus of these articles to the Cyrus Cylinder, transforming this artifact of 539 BCE into a founding document for the articulation of global human rights. They also established a narrative of civilizational continuity between pre-Islamic and Islamic Iran by linking what they called a “the Cyrusian ethos of equality” to Perso-Islamic mystical humanism. As this paper argues, this civilizational narrative, crafted by these lawyers, was the basis on which Iran secured the hosting of the first international UN conference on human rights in 1968.

“Sovereignty and Rights in the Age of Global Governance”
by /

How to secure Iran’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity was a fraught issue at the end of the Second World War. With the Anglo-Soviet invasion of August 1941, the forced abdication of Reza Shah Pahlevi, and the intensification of political, ethnic, religious, linguistic and ideological rivalry during the war years, this old concern became the most contentious of political riddles. At this crucial historical juncture, Iranian lawyers, diplomats, academics and institutions increasingly recognized the pragmatic utility of the constitutionally sanctioned “equality rights” law-and-order mode of governance articulated during the Constitutional Revolution (1906-1909). However, for forty years this framework—first secured in Articles VIII and IX of the 1907 Supplementary Constitutional Law—had lain dormant. In the postwar period, and via the new forum provided by the UN, they would become politically active once again.

This paper explores how a generation of Iranian lawyers and diplomats aligned Articles VIII and IX with the founding documents of the United Nations: the 1941 Atlantic Charter, the 1942 United Nations Declaration and the 1945 United Nations Charter. With the ratification of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles VIII and IX were increasingly constituted as fundamental principles for legal, social and political conduct in post-WWII Iran. To give further impetus to their arguments for this “equality rights” framework, Iranian lawyers fused the equal rights and equal protection focus of these articles to the Cyrus Cylinder, transforming this artifact of 539 BCE into a founding document for the articulation of global human rights. They also established a narrative of civilizational continuity between pre-Islamic and Islamic Iran by linking what they called a “the Cyrusian ethos of equality” to Perso-Islamic mystical humanism. As this paper argues, this civilizational narrative, crafted by these lawyers, was the basis on which Iran secured the hosting of the first international UN conference on human rights in 1968.

“From the Tehran Conference to the Korean War: Iran as a ‘Test Case’ for the United Nations, 1943-1953”
by /

On January 23, 1943, the Division of Near Eastern Affairs at the State Department set out the US’s new policy on Iran. Written by analyst John Jernegan, it was highly critical of both Great Britain and the Soviet Union as occupying wartime powers; neither was trusted to preserve Iran’s independence or to protect her territorial autonomy. The “result” of the British and Soviet occupations, wrote Jernagan, “has been interference with the internal affairs of Iran, amounting at times to a virtually complete negation of Iranian sovereignty and independence. . . largely because of this occupation of Iranian territory, the governmental machinery of Iran, and its economic structure, have been seriously weakened.” The US policy, by contrast, was to strengthen Iranian independence by strengthening her institutions. The objective was, in Jernagan’s words, the “development, with American assistance, of a stable Iranian government and a strong Iranian economy.” At the war’s end Iran was no longer to be under British trusteeship or Soviet tutelage: she was to be secured as a sovereign nation.

At the Tehran Conference of 1943, the Allies discussed the shape of the postwar international order and the place of Iranian sovereignty within it. President Franklin D. Roosevelt is credited with the view that Iran would be a “test case” for the success of the postwar order embodied by the United Nations. Yet his view did not shape the years to come. Between the Tehran Conference, the Azerbeijan crisis, the heating up of the Cold War and the onset of war on the Korean peninsula, this paper traces the US position on Iran and the UN from Roosevelt to Truman and from an endorsement of Iran’s sovereignty to a willingness to subvert it. It highlights the ongoing conflict between the United States and Great Britain regarding Iran, which was not solved in 1945, as well as the dramatic transformation of US policy between 1943 and 1953.