The Idea of the Disparity of the Intellects in Perso-Islamic Thought

The doctrine of the disparity of the human intellects displays a lasting presence in the history of the Perso-Islamic thought. As such, it has conceptually contributed to a political ideology and reality: that is, the disparity of Iranians’ political rights. Democracy, it is resourcefully argued, requires that the citizens enjoy equal rights of authorship of the law (collective autonomy). According to the doctrine of the disparity of the human intellects, however, there exists a natural hierarchy among people’s intellectual faculties. In the Iranian case this epistemological verdict has been historically translated into a nondemocratic political belief according to which those with inferior shares of intellect – including, allegedly, women and the crowd – are naturally in need of the Wiseman’s authoritative guidance and guardianship. The residents of the city, therefore, cannot have equal rights of citizenship: they are not citizens but the subjects of the State. The doctrine of the disparity of the intellects is also a recurrent theme in the Perso-Islamic mysticism, particularly manifest in the authoritative relationship between the Morshed (the guide) and the Salek (the follower). We may conclude that the relation of authority – and not democratic equality – between the members of the Iranian society is legitimated by not only the philosophical but also the mystical elements of tradition. My paper studies the deep-seated doctrine of the disparity of the human intellects as it occasionally surfaced in medieval Perso-Islamic thought. I shall choose a philosopher (Nasireddin-e Tusi), a theologian (Abuhamed-e Ghazzali) and a mystic (Eynolqozat-e Hamedani) as representatives of their respective intellectual schools and examine how their belief in the disparity doctrine contributes to their affirmation of political despotism as the noble mode of statecraft. It is my contention that the mentality of the likes of these cultural figures continues to in part foreclose the possibility of democratic citizenship in the Iranian context. My paper’s contribution, therefore, resides in its critical reading of a significant intellectual barrier to the egalitarian idea of political rights in contemporary Iran.