The so-called “Turkish Question,” the Christian-European concern about Ottoman aggression vis-à-vis southeastern Europe, the fear that the Turks might take Vienna and push into the heart of Europe, and the attempts to thwart this offensive by way of forging a grand Christian collation, exercised European rulers from 1453 until the late seventeenth century. It is also a well-worn research topic, especially in German- and Italian-language scholarship.
Less well known is that, next to the Habsburgs, the Spanish, the Papacy and the Russians, the Iranians were active participants in the long-standing efforts to challenge and repulse the Ottomans, both as recipients of countless envoys from European nations eager to complete the “cordon sanitaire” around the Ottomans by bringing the Safavids into the alliance, and as agents interested in neutralizing the Turks for their own reasons.
My paper looks at the role of Iran in this protracted geopolitical “game,” and it does so from the “Iranian” perspective, focusing on what moved and motivated successive Safavid rulers to play their part in it. Using a plethora of sources, from diplomatic letters in a dozen languages to travel accounts, missionary reports and court chronicles, it examines Safavid reactions to Western diplomatic overtures in the context of Iran’s own concerns. Involving a geopolitical universe that stretched all the way from Lisbon to Hyderabad, these concerns were marked by a visceral urge to avoid having to fight a war on two fronts simultaneously, which translates as a strong and carefully pursued policy aimed at maintaining a balance of power with the mostly Sunni neighbors, the Ottomans, the Uzbeks of Central Asia and the Indian Mughals.
