Philosophy as Religion: Mullā Ṣadrā on the Concept of Dīn

In classical Islamic philosophy, religion and philosophy constituted two different modes in which one presents and understands truth. Religion, particularly through the act of revelation, presented a rhetorical, narrative and persuasive account of the nature of reality and the relationship between God, humanity and the cosmos; but unless one accepted the prior truth of revelation, it could not yield certain knowledge, predicated on Aristotelian and Neoplatonic notions of argumentation and the burden of proof. Philosophy, on the other hand, as a demonstrative approach outlining the nature of these three realities and their intersections did yield certainty. In this sense, arguably both al-Fārābī and Averroes considered philosophy to be a superior discourse on metaphysics and ethics than religion.
From the middle period, especially as Illuminationist (ishrāqī) notions of philosophy became closer to religion, insofar as philosophy entailed a way of life and spiritual practices, the boundaries between religious and philosophical discourse blurred. By the time, one arrived at the middle Safavid period with the sage Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (d. 1045/1635), the clear generic boundaries between theological discourse, philosophy, speculative mysticism, and even exegesis (whether of the Qurʾan or of the sayings of the Imams) were set aside in pursuit of wisdom and truth. The role of the sage was to pursue wisdom and arrive as truth, to become divine-like (mutaʾallih) as a realized sage who understood the nature of reality and was capable of communicating it to different audiences in different modes. Philosophy as a way of life entailed a religious commitment and a ethical imperative to be in a particular way.
In this paper, I will analyse the notion of dīn, insofar as one might render it religion (whilst considering the problematic of this category in the study of religion as a discursive practice), in the thought of Mullā Ṣadrā, focusing on the discussion of the term as it is discussed in his magnum opus the Four Journeys (al-asfār al-arbaʿa) and in his exegesis of the Qurʾanic phrase ‘there is no compulsion in religion’ (lā ikrahā fī-l-dīn). What emerges is a holistic approach to knowledge and indeed to religious commitment that has implications not only for his views on the relationship of philosophy and religion but also on the modern theology of religions and ethical pluralism in a world of peer epistemic anxiety.