Ijtihad as Ethically Falsifiable: The New Jurisprudence of Abolqassem Fanaei,” presents and builds on the work of a contemporary Shi‘i ethicist and innovative ex-mujtahid from Iran, Abolqassem Fanaei (Ethics PhD from UK). Fanaei, taking ethical intuitionism seriously, suggests a new methodology for ijtihād. He proposes that the interpretation of religious primary sources should be ethically falsifiable because a mujtahid should be able to trust his ethical intuition. In essence, if a certain interpretation does not pass the test of a mujtahid’s intuition, it fails to be a viable reading.
To create a new Islam, Fanaei suggests, we need to create a new methodology for ijtihād and in order to do that we need to allow the primary sources to be ethically falsifiable and in order to do that a mujtahid needs to trust that his intellectual supposition (ẓann ‘aqlī) which is based on observation (shuhūd) and reasoning (istidlāl ‘aqlānī) is a good enough proof (hujja). One of the more important presuppositions a cleric holds is the circumstances, under which, it is morally wrong (or epistemically irrational, or imprudent) to hold a belief on insufficient evidence. Fanaei claims that the current rules of ijtihad give no credence to suppositions that can be logically derived from the intellect and empirical data. When the choice to pick between rationality and tradition presents itself, tradition (literal readings of primary sources) always takes the upper hand. It is true that Shi‘i clerics are taught to use their judgement in coming up with innovative solutions, but in reality, Fanaei contends, they always take the conservative route because they are simultaneously taught that as fallible human beings, their intuition cannot be trusted. The result is a Shi‘ī orthodoxy, that has few to no tools for innovation.
Fanaei’s epistemological innovation is to suggest that a certain number of rational and empirical suppositions do in fact have value and validity and so do a certain number of transmitted conjectures. But in the case of opposition (ta‘āruḍ) between the conjectures, the supposition with greater epistemological support is the one that should be given preference. At the end of the day, our intellect must win and it wins because we intuitively know the difference between wrong and right.
