Historical events profoundly affect a society’s collective memory. Undoubtedly, the tenure of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossaddegh (1951-1953), his nationalization of the oil industry, and his subsequent overthrow by the newly elected Eisenhower administration is, for Iranians, one of them.
This paper explores how the decision to overthrow Mossaddegh was taken within the Eisenhower administration, and why the previous Truman administration strove to resolve peacefully the dispute between London and Tehran, while the Eisenhower one accepted with enthusiasm the coup d’état. It uses a dual theoretical framework, combining a constructivist approach with a decision –making analysis. Therefore, I first apply the constructivist approach to Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), examining the perception of leaders, the construction of the “Other,” and various speech acts within the two administrations. Second, I explain the decision-making approaches within the Eisenhower administration.
Thus I first analyze and compare the perceptions which George McGhee and John Foster Dulles --two preeminent members of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations respectively—had of Mossaddegh. Then I demonstrate that while the Truman administration considered him a “nationalist leader”, high-ranking cabinet members of the Eisenhower administration constructed an “Iranian danger” by presenting Mossaddegh as a Communist or a fanatical madman, using analogies to Czechoslovakia, China, and Korea. Finally and briefly, I “deconstruct” this perceived threat to show that Mossaddegh was not a Communist.
Subsequently, I apply various methods of decision-making analysis to the Eisenhower administration to demonstrate that there was a monopolization of information by the two bothers Allen (CIA Director) and John Forster Dulles (Secretary of State), which was a direct consequence of Eisenhower’s presidential style: passive and delegation-prone. This also created an administration obsessed with silence, so that the President could always rely on “plausible deniability” if the Mossaddegh overthrow did not go according to plan. Moreover, the administration was prone to “groupthink”, leaving no place for dissident voices even among the “Iran experts” in the White House, or at the embassy in Tehran: A case in point is the summary dismissal of Roger Goiran, a diplomat stationed in Tehran, who got fired for not agreeing to the plan...
Introduction:
Various historical events profoundly affect a society’s collective memory. Undoubtedly, the tenure of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossaddegh (1951-1953), his nationalization of the oil industry and his subsequent overthrow by the newly elected Eisenhower administration is, for Iranians, one of them.
In this paper, we attempt to see how the decision to overthrow Mossaddegh was taken within the Eisenhower administration? In short, how is it that the previous Truman administration put a lot of energy to resolve peacefully the dispute between London and Tehran, while the Eisenhower one accepted with enthusiasm the coup d’état?
Theoretical Framework:
To answer this question, we use a dual theoretical framework, joining “constructivism” and “decision-making approach”. Therefore, we first reiterate some important addition of constructivism to the study of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA); as the perception of leaders, the construction of the “Other” and speech acts. Second, we explain the two main decision-making approaches we use here (the presidential style and decision structures).
Case Study:
First of all, we analyze and compare the perception of the most preeminent members of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations toward Mossaddegh. Evidently, George McGhee did not perceive the Iranian leader in the same way that John Foster Dulles did.
Secondly, we will demonstrate how, contrarily to the Truman administration who talked about a “Nationalist leader”, the Eisenhower one constructed an “Iranian danger” by presenting Mossaddegh as a Communist or a fanatical madman. We will also present the two main tools used by high-ranking cabinet members to create this turmoil: “speech acts” and different analogies (Czechoslovakia, China, and Korea). Finally and briefly, we “deconstruct” this threat to show that Mossaddegh was not a Communist.
Subsequently, we apply our decision-making approach to the Eisenhower administration to demonstrate that there was a monopolization of information from the two bothers Allen (CIA Director) and John Forster Dulles (Secretary of State). Of course, this is a direct consequence of Eisenhower’s presidential style: passive and delegation-prone. This also created an administration obsessed with silence so that the President could always rely on “plausible deniability” if the Mossaddegh overthrow did not go according to plan. Moreover, the administration was bolstered by “groupthink”, leaving no place for dissidence voices; even among “Iran experts” in the White House or at the embassy in Tehran. As was the case of Roger Goiran, a diplomat stationed in Tehran who got fired for not agreeing to the plan...
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