Ziai on the Distinction Between Peripatetic and Illumination Epistemology

The purpose of this paper is to examine Ziai’s analysis and reconstruction of Illuminationist Epistemology and its distinction from the Peripatetic tradition. My paper will be divided into two parts. In the first part I will investigate Ziai’s view of the theory of definition in the Illuminationist tradition. I will show how Ziai brought to our attention two significant distinctions between the Aristotelian and Illuminationist views of the logical definition. The first distinction is related to the different senses of “definition.” While Aristotle logic is limited to two types of definition, real and nominal definitions, Illuminationist, Suhrawardi in particular, provides more complex and rich concept of definition. In his discussion of the notion of “expository proposition,” Suhrawardi affirms that it consists of five types of definition—complete essentialist definition, conceptualist definition, incomplete essentialist definition, complete description, and incomplete description. Another distinction is pertained to the formula of the definition. For unlike the Aristotle, Suhrwardi, in his treatment to the concept of definition questions epistemological and ontological foundation of definition. Ziai demonstrated to us how the methodology of definition, in Illuminationist tradition should be considered as one of the basic element of our philosophical approach to the subject matter of metaphysics.
The second parts of the papers focuses on the Illuminationist theory of perception, division of knowledge, and self-knowledge. In it I will show how Ziai’s analysis of key concepts pertaining to Illuminationist psychology, such as “knowledge by presence,” “formal knowledge,” illuminationist relation and “self-conscious” enable us to understand the significance of their system of epistemology and at the same time marks a clear departure from the Aristotelian psychology.